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HIGHT is a block cipher designed in Korea with the involvement of Korea Information
Security Agency. It was proposed at CHES 2006 for usage in lightweight applications such
as sensor networks and RFID tags. Lately, it has been adopted as ISO standard. Though there
is a great deal of cryptanalytic results on HIGHT, its security evaluation against the recent
zero-correlation linear attacks is still lacking. At the same time, the Feistel-type structure
of HIGHT suggests that it might be susceptible to this type of cryptanalysis. In this paper,
we aim to bridge this gap.
We identify zero-correlation linear approximations over 16 rounds of HIGHT. Based upon
those, we attack 27-round HIGHT (round 4 to round 30) with improved time complexity
and practical memory requirements. This attack of ours is the best result on HIGHT to
date in the classical single-key setting. We also provide the ﬁrst attack on 26-round HIGHT
(round 4 to round 29) with the full whitening key.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
1.1. Lightweight block ciphers, HIGHT, and existing
cryptanalysis
With emerging pervasive applications in mind such as
sensor networks, RFID tags and medical devices, a va-
riety of lightweight cryptographic algorithms have been
lately proposed including the two block ciphers adopted as
ISO/IEC standard for lightweight encryption: PRESENT [7]
proposed at CHES 2007 and CLEFIA [8] proposed at
FSE 2007. Many more lightweight block ciphers have
been published since then. Even the U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA) has very recently contributed to the trend
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with two lightweight block ciphers: Simon and Speck [1].
HIGHT [6] is another lightweight block cipher designed
with governmental involvement – Korea Information Secu-
rity Agency (KISA).
HIGHT was proposed at CHES 2006 and then adopted
as ISO standard block cipher [9]. HIGHT has 32 rounds.
It accepts a 64-bit block and a 128-bit key. Each round
consists of four parallel Feistel functions. Whitening keys
are applied before the ﬁrst and after the last round. The se-
curity of HIGHT has been extensively evaluated. Zhang
et al. [10] present an integral attack on 22-round HIGHT
at CANS 2009 and the time complexity is then reduced by
Sasaki and Wang [11] at SAC 2012. In the impossible dif-
ferential cryptanalysis of HIGHT, to be able to cryptanalyze
more rounds, most of the existing attacks do not con-
sider the pre-whitening key except the attack on 27-round
HIGHT given in [14] at AfricaCrypt 2012. Lu [12] gives the
ﬁrst impossible differential cryptanalysis against 25-round
HIGHT. Then at ACISP 2009, Özen et al. [13] successfully
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2014.01.007
0020-0190 © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Table 1
Summary of single-key attacks on HIGHT.
Attack Rounds Pre./Post. Data Time Memory Ref.
IA 22 (1∼22) / 262 CPs 2118.71 ENs 264 Bytes [10]
IA 22 (1∼22) / 262 CPs 2102.35 ENs 264 Bytes [11]
ID 25 (6∼30) –/ 260 CPs 2126.78 ENs N/A [12]
ID 26 (1∼26) –/ 261 CPs 2119.53 ENs 2109 Bytes [13]
ID 26 (5∼30) –/ 261.6 CP 2114.35 ENs 287.6 Bytes [14]
ZC 26 (4∼29) / 262.79 KPs 2119.1 ENs 243 Bytes Section 4.1
ID 27 (4∼30) / 258 CPs 2126.6 ENs +2120 MAs 2120 Bytes [14]
ZC 27 (4∼30) / 262.79 KPs 2120.78 ENs 243 Bytes Section 4.2
IA: Integral Attack; ID: Impossible Differential; ZC: Zero-Correlation Linear; Pre.: Pre-Whitening; Post.: Post-Whitening; CP: Chosen Plaintext; KP: Known
Plaintext; MA: Memory Access; EN: Encryption.
mount an impossible differential attack on 26-round HIGHT.
This result was then improved by Chen et al. [14] at
AfricaCrypt 2012. Note that the attack on 27-round HIGHT
with full whitening keys considered proposed in [14] has
time complexity 2126.6 encryptions and 2120 memory ac-
cesses to a table of 2120 bytes, which can be considered
marginal with respect to brute force. In the related-key
setting, attacks on 28-round [12] and 31-round [13] HIGHT
were presented using impossible differential attack and
related-key rectangle attack on the full HIGHT was re-
ported in [17]. Recently, independent biclique attacks –
belonging to the class of polynomial advantage attacks –
on the full HIGHT have been obtained in [15,16] with time
complexities 2126.4 and 2125.9 encryptions, respectively.
1.2. Zero-correlation cryptanalysis
Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis proposed by Bog-
danov and Rijmen in [4] is a novel promising attack tech-
nique for block ciphers which has its theoretical founda-
tion in the availability of numerous key-independent unbi-
ased linear approximations with correlation zero for many
ciphers. (If p is the probability for a linear approximation
to hold, its correlation is deﬁned as c = 2p−1.) Though the
initial distinguisher of [4] had some limitations in terms
of data complexity, they were overcome in the FSE 2012
paper [5], where the existence of multiple linear approx-
imations with correlation zero in target ciphers was used
to propose a more data-eﬃcient distinguisher. In a follow-
up work at AsiaCrypt 2012 [2], fundamental links of in-
tegral cryptanalysis to zero-correlation cryptanalysis have
been revealed. Namely, integrals (similar to saturation or
multiset distinguishers) have been demonstrated to be es-
sentially a special case of the zero-correlation property.
On top of that, a multidimensional distinguisher has been
constructed for the zero-correlation property, which re-
moved the unnecessary independency assumptions on the
distinguishing side. At SAC 2013 [3], an FFT technique for
speeding up the key recovery in zero-correlation attacks
has been proposed, which resulted in increasing the num-
ber of rounds that can be cryptanalyzed for Camellia-128
and Camellia-192 in the single-key setting.
1.3. Our contributions
In this paper, we evaluate the security of HIGHT with
respect to the recent technique of zero-correlation linear
cryptanalysis. Our contributions can be summarized as fol-
lows.
1. We reveal 16-round linear approximations of correla-
tion zero in HIGHT.
2. Based on those approximations, we propose a multi-
dimensional zero-correlation attack on 27 rounds of
HIGHT (round 4 to round 30) with all whitening keys.
As mentioned above, in the single-key setting, the at-
tack on the highest number of HIGHT rounds is the
27-round impossible differential attack of [14]. How-
ever, the latter provides only a marginal improvement
over the brute force, given the enormous number of
random accesses to a huge memory (see Table 1).
Our zero-correlation attack features a lower time com-
plexity that does not involve expensive memory ac-
cesses and a signiﬁcantly reduced memory complexity,
which is in fact practical. Our attack is arguably the
best non-exhaustive attack on HIGHT in the classical
single-key setting.
3. We provide a key-recovery attack on 26-round HIGHT
(round 4 to round 29) with all whitening keys. Note
that all previous attacks on 26-round HIGHT ig-
nored the pre-whitening key. To do this, we use the
technique of multidimensional zero-correlation linear
cryptanalysis. Thus, this attack of ours is the ﬁrst one
on 26-round HIGHT with all whitening keys in the sin-
gle secret key setting.
Our results along with the previous attacks on HIGHT are
shown in Table 1.
1.4. Outline
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy de-
scribes HIGHT and outlines the ideas of zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis. Section 3 presents our zero-correlation
linear approximations that span 16 rounds of HIGHT. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates our attacks on 26-round and 27-round
HIGHT. We conclude in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
: addition modular 28
⊕: exclusive-OR (XOR)
Pi,Ci : the i-th byte of plaintext and ciphertext, 0 i  7
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Algorithm 1 Key schedule of HIGHT.
1: WK0 = MK12, WK1 = MK13, WK2 = MK14, WK3 = MK15
2: WK5 = MK0, WK5 = MK1, WK6 = MK2, WK7 = MK3
3: s0 = 0, s1 = 1, s2 = 0, s3 = 1, s4 = 1, s5 = 0, s6 = 1
4: δ0 = s6|s5|s4|s3|s2|s1|s0
5: for i = 1 → 127 do
6: si+6 = si+1 ⊕ si−1
7: δi = si+6|si+5|si+4|si+3|si+2|si+1|si
8: end for
9: for i = 0 → 7 do
10: for j = 0 → 7 do
11: SK16i+ j = MK( j−i)mod8 δ16i+ j
12: end for
13: for j = 0 → 7 do
14: SK16i+ j+8 = MK(( j−i)mod8)+8 δ16i+ j+8
15: end for
16: end for
Xr : the input value of round r, 1 r  32
Xri : the i-th byte of X
r , 0  i  7, corresponding to eight
branches
Xri( j): the j-th bit of X
r
i , 0 j  7
MKi : the i-th master key byte, 0 i  15
WKi : the i-th whitening key, 0 i  7
SKi : the i-th subkey, 0 i  127
≪ s: cyclic left shift by s bits, 0 s 7
|: concatenation of bits or bytes
2.2. Description of HIGHT
HIGHT is a 32-round lightweight block cipher with a
64-bit block and a 128-bit master key. It is an 8-line
type-II generalized Feistel network: Each round consists
of four parallel applications of F0 and F1 functions.
Whitening keys are added before the ﬁrst and after
the last round. The 16-byte master key is denoted as
(MK15,MK14, . . . ,MK0); the eight whitening key bytes are
given by (WK7,WK6, . . . ,WK0); we address the 128 sub-
key bytes by (SK127, SK126, . . . , SK0). Both the whitening
keys and subkeys are generated from the master key by
the key schedule shown in Algorithm 1. Both the whiten-
ing keys and subkeys are generated from the master key.
The relation between master key bytes and partial subkeys
and whitening keys are shown in Table 2.
The 64-bit plaintext P and ciphertext C are denoted
as (P7| · · · |P0) and (C7| · · · |C0), respectively. The 64-bit in-
put Xi of round i is denoted as (Xi7| · · · |Xi0). The encryption
Algorithm 2 Encryption process of HIGHT.
1: // Pre-Whitening
2: X07 = P7,X06 = P6 ⊕WK3, X05 = P5, X04 = P4WK2
3: X03 = P3, X02 = P2 ⊕WK1, X01 = P1, X00 = P0WK0
4: for i = 0 → 30 do
5: Xi+17 = Xi6, Xi+16 = Xi5 (F1(Xi4) ⊕ SK4i+2)
6: Xi+15 = Xi4, Xi+14 = Xi3 ⊕ (F0(Xi2) SK4i+1)
7: Xi+13 = Xi2, Xi+12 = Xi1 (F1(Xi0) ⊕ SK4i)
8: Xi+11 = Xi0, Xi+10 = Xi7 ⊕ (F0(Xi6) SK4i+3)
9: end for
10: for i = 31 do
11: Xi+17 = Xi7 ⊕ (F0(Xi6) SK127), Xi+16 = Xi6
12: Xi+15 = Xi5 (F1(Xi4) ⊕ SK126), Xi+14 = Xi4
13: Xi+13 = Xi3 ⊕ (F0(Xi2) SK125), Xi+12 = Xi2
14: Xi+11 = Xi1 (F1(Xi0) ⊕ SK124), Xi+10 = Xi0
15: end for
16: // Post-Whitening
17: C7 = X327 , C6 = X326 ⊕WK7, C5 = X325 , C4 = X324 WK6
18: C3 = X323 , C2 = X322 ⊕WK5, C1 = X321 , C0 = X320 WK4
process of HIGHT is shown in Algorithm 2, in which
F0(x) = (x ≪ 1) ⊕ (x ≪ 2) ⊕ (x ≪ 7) and F1(x) =
(x≪ 3) ⊕ (x≪ 4) ⊕ (x≪ 6).
2.3. Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
In this section, we brieﬂy recall the basic concepts of
zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis based on [4] and [2].
First, we brieﬂy mention the concept of correlation for
linear approximations. We denote the scalar product of
binary vectors by a  x =⊕ni=1 aixi . Linear cryptanalysis
is based on linear approximations determined by input
mask α and output mask β . A linear approximation α → β
of a vectorial function f has a correlation deﬁned by
C
(
β  f (x),α  x)= 2Pr
x
(
β  f (x) ⊕ α  x = 0)− 1.
In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the distingui-
sher uses linear approximations with zero correlation for
all keys while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes lin-
ear approximations with correlation as far from zero as
possible.
In [2], Bogdanov et al. proposed a multidimensional
zero-correlation linear distinguisher using  zero-correla-
tion linear approximations and requiring O(2n/√ ) known
plaintexts, where n is the block size of a cipher.
Table 2
Partial key relation of HIGHT.
R Subkey used
Pre. WK3(MK15) WK2(MK14) WK1(MK13) WK0(MK12)
4 SK15(MK15) SK14(MK14) SK13(MK13) SK12(MK12)
5 SK19(MK2) SK18(MK1) SK17(MK0) SK16(MK7)
6 SK23(MK6) SK22(MK5) SK21(MK4) SK20(MK3)
7 SK27(MK10) SK26(MK9) SK25(MK8) SK24(MK15)
8 SK31(MK14) SK30(MK13) SK29(MK12) SK28(MK11)
9 SK35(MK1) SK34(MK0) SK33(MK7) SK32(MK6)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26 SK103(MK1) SK102(MK0) SK101(MK7) SK100(MK6)
27 SK107(MK13) SK106(MK12) SK105(MK11) SK104(MK10)
28 SK111(MK9) SK110(MK8) SK109(MK15) SK108(MK14)
29 SK115(MK4) SK114(MK3) SK113(MK2) SK112(MK1)
30 SK119(MK0) SK118(MK7) SK117(MK6) SK116(MK5)
Post. WK7(MK3) WK6(MK2) WK5(MK1) WK4(MK0)
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Table 3
Zero-correlation linear approximations for 16-round HIGHT.















↓1 0 0 0 00000001 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 00000001 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 00000001 00110100 0 0 0 0 0
4 00000001 001????? ? 0 0 0 0 0
5 111????? ? ? 0 0 0 0 00000001
6 ? ? ? 0 0 0 00000001 111?????
7 ? ? ? 0 0 00000001 110????? ?
8 ? ? ? 0 00000001 1??????? ? ?
9 ? ? ? 00000001 0??????? ? ? ?
9 ? ? ? ? 1??????? ? ? ?
10 ? ? 0 1??????? ? ? ? ?
11 0 0 1??????? ? ? ? ? ?
12 0 1??????? ? ? ? ? 0 0
13 1??????? ? ? ? 0 0 0 0
14 ? ? 0 0 0 0 0 1???????
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 1??????? ?
16 0 0 0 0 0 1??????? 0 0
↑17 0 0 0 0 1??????? 0 0 0
In multidimensional zero-correlation cryptanalysis, the key
recovery works as follows. For an n-bit block cipher, if
there are m independent zero-correlation linear approx-
imations such that all  = 2m non-zero linear combina-
tions of them have zero correlation, the number of re-
quired known plaintexts N is O(2n/√). For each of the
2m values z ∈ Fm2 , the attacker initializes a counter V [z],
z = 0,1,2, . . . ,2m − 1, to value zero. The attacker partially
encrypts and decrypts each plaintext-ciphertext pair to the
boundaries of zero-correlation linear approximations by
guessing some key values and computes the corresponding
data value in Fm2 by evaluating the m basis linear approxi-
mations and increments the counter V [z] of this data value




(V [z] − N2−m)2
N2−m(1− 2−m) .
The statistic T for the right key guess follows a χ2 distri-
bution with mean μ0 = ( − 1) 2n−N2n−1 and variance σ 20 =
2( − 1)( 2n−N2n−1 )2, while for the wrong key guess it fol-
lows a χ2-distribution with mean μ1 = − 1 and variance
σ 21 = 2( − 1).
We denote the type-I error probability as α0 (the
probability to wrongfully discard the right key guess),
the type-II error probability as α1 (the probability to
wrongfully accept a wrong key guess as the right key).
If we consider the decision threshold τ = μ0 + σ0q1−α0 =
μ1 − σ1q1−α1 , then the number of distinct known plain-
texts is
N = (2
n − 1)(q1−α0 + q1−α1)√
( − 1)/2+ q1−α0
+ 1,
where q1−α0 and q1−α1 are the respective quantiles of the
standard normal distribution.
3. Zero-correlation linear approximations of 16-round
HIGHT
To discuss the linear approximations, we need a proper
way to denote linear masks. Hence, in the rest of the pa-
per, if a mask on one byte is zero or undetermined in all 8
bits, we denote it with a single ‘0’ or ‘?’, respectively. Oth-
erwise, we will refer to this mask bit by bit where ‘0’, ‘1’
and ‘?’ stand for a zero, nonzero and undetermined single-
bit mask value.
Based on properties of correlation for linear approxi-
mations over basic operations used in HIGHT such as lin-
ear map, XOR, branching, and modular addition proposed
in [4,5], we derive a variety of zero-correlation linear ap-
proximations for 16-round HIGHT.
Theorem 1. Denote the input mask as α = (α7,α6, . . . ,α0)
and output mask after 16 rounds of HIGHT as β = (β7, β6,
. . . , β0). For any αi = 00000001, α j = 0, j = i, 0  i, j  7,
βk = 1???????, βl = 0, l = k, 0  l,k  7, if (i,k) ∈ {(6,5),
(4,3), (2,1), (0,7)}, then the linear approximations α 16r−−→ β
have correlation zero. For each (i,k) ∈ {(6,5), (4,3), (2,1),
(0,7)}, there exist 128 linear approximations conforming to
α 16r−−→ β .
Due to limited space here, we do not provide the proof
of Theorem 1. However, we list the details of the zero-
correlation linear approximations over 16-round HIGHT
when (i,k) = (4,3) in Table 3 since this kind of linear ap-
proximations will be used in our attack.
4. Key-recovery attack on 26/27-round HIGHT
In this section, we describe our attacks on 26 and 27
rounds of HIGHT. We use the key schedule of HIGHT to
reduce the number of guessed bits in our attack. The num-
ber of guessed key bits is affected by several param-
eters including the zero-correlation linear property we
choose (values of α and β), the position of the property
(rounds spanned by zero-correlation approximations), and
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Fig. 1. Initial ﬁve rounds encryption.
the number of rounds added before and after this prop-
erty. To optimize the attack complexities, a proper choice
of these parameters is needed. We have implemented the
search for the best parameters in a computer program
which counts the number of guessed key bits in the par-
tial encryption/decryption phase for all possible combina-
tions of the parameters. To reduce the time complexity, we
choose parameters with the least number of guessed key
bits.
As a result, we can attack 26-round HIGHT (round 4
to round 29) with the full whitening key by spanning
rounds 9 to 24 with the 16-round zero-correlation lin-
ear property of Theorem 1 and adding ﬁve rounds be-
fore and after the property. Also we can attack 27-round
HIGHT (round 4 to round 30) with the full whitening key
if we add ﬁve rounds before and six rounds after the zero-
correlation property. We provide our attacks on 26- and
27-round HIGHT in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4.1. Key-recovery attack on 26-round HIGHT
The ﬁve initial rounds and ﬁve ﬁnal rounds involved in
the attack on 26-round HIGHT are shown in Fig. 1 and
Fig. 2, respectively. We need to encrypt and decrypt N
(P ,C) pairs to the boundaries of those zero-correlation
linear approximations. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, we only show
those intermediate state values, the subkeys, and whiten-
ing keys computed or guessed in the partial encryption
and decryption process. The guessed subkeys and whiten-
ing keys are denoted with their corresponding master key
bytes. Then the key-recovery attack on 26-round HIGHT
is proceeded with partial-sum technique from Step 1 to
Step 16 as follows.
1. Allocate a counter vector V1[X94(0)|C7|C6|C5|C4|X293 ] of
size 241 where each element is 32-bit length and ini-
tialize to zero.
2. Guess all possible values of 50 master key bits MK15,
MK14, MK13, MK2, MK1, MK6, MK3(0) , MK12(0) .
3. Partially encrypt and decrypt each of N (P ,C) pairs to




3 = C3 ⊕ (F0(C2 ⊕ WK5) 
SK113)). Add one to the corresponding V1[X94(0)|C7|C6|
C5|C4|X293 ].
The time complexity of Step 3 is no more than N · 250 ·
5
26 26-round encryptions. Then, we proceed Steps 4–13
shown in Table 4. The second column stands for the mas-
ter key byte or bit that should be guessed in each step
and the corresponding subkey or whitening key is listed in
the third column. The column headed as “#Bits” denotes
the number of new guessed master key bits introduced
in each step. The ﬁfth column is the state value to be
computed with the guessed key and known state value.
We set up counters in each step to reduce time complex-
ity. The counters we set are shown in column headed as
“Counter” and its size is shown in the next column head
as “Size”. The computational complexity of each step is
shown in the last column, measured with 1/4 round en-
cryption except those steps noted with ‘†’.
To be more clear we explain Step 4 of Table 4 in de-
tails. In Step 4 of Table 4, we set up a counter vector
V2[X94(0)|C7|C6|C5|X294 |X293 ] of size 241 where each ele-
ment is 32-bit length and initialize to zero and guess mas-
ter key byte MK2 corresponding to WK6. There is no new
master key bits introduced since the value of MK2 has al-
ready been guessed in Step 2. Compute C4 WK6 → X294
L. Wen et al. / Information Processing Letters 114 (2014) 322–330 327
Fig. 2. Final ﬁve rounds decryption.
Fig. 3. Final six rounds decryption.
and add the corresponding V1[X94(0)|C7|C6|C5|C4|X293 ] to
V2[X94(0)|C7|C6|C5|X294 |X293 ]. Step 5 to Step 13 are pro-
ceeded in a similar way and after Step 13 we get the coun-
ters V11[X94(0)|X253 ] for all possible values of (X94(0)|X253 ).
Note that to reduce the time complexity of Step 12 of
Table 4, we guess the key byte of MK7 bit by bit, from the
least signiﬁcant bit to the most signiﬁcant bit. The detailed
procedure is shown in Table 5. The columns in Table 5
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Table 4
Partial decryption procedure of the attack on 26-round HIGHT.
Step Guess Known key #Bits Computing Counter Size Comp.
4 MK2 WK6 0 C4WK6 → X294 V2[X94(0)|C7|C6|C5|X294 |X293 ] 41 241 · 250†
5 MK3(7∼1)* SK114(7∼1) 7 C5 (F1(X294 ) ⊕ SK114) → X295 V3[X94(0)|C7|C6|X295 |X294 |X293 ] 41 241 · 257
6 MK15 SK109 0 X294 ⊕ (F0(X293 ) SK109) → X283 V4[X94(0)|C7|C6|X295 |X283 ] 33 241 · 257
7 MK3 WK7 0 C6 ⊕WK7 → X296 V5[X94(0)|C7|X296 |X295 |X283 ] 33 233 · 257†
8 MK4 SK115 8 C7 ⊕ (F0(X296 ) SK115) → X297 V6[X94(0)|X297 |X296 |X295 |X283 ] 33 233 · 265
9 MK8 SK110 8 X296  (F1(X295 ) ⊕ SK110) → X285 V7[X94(0)|X297 |X295 |X285 |X283 ] 33 233 · 273
10 MK11 SK105 8 X295 ⊕ (F0(X283 ) SK105) → X273 V8[X94(0)|X297 |X285 |X273 ] 25 233 · 281
11 MK12(7∼1)* SK106(7∼1) 7 X297  (F1(X285 ) ⊕ SK106) → X275 V9[X94(0)|X285 |X275 |X273 ] 25 225 · 288
12 MK7 SK101 8 X285 ⊕ (F0(X273 ) SK101) → X263 V10[X94(0)|X275 |X263 ] 17 2117‡
13 MK3 SK97 0 X275 ⊕ (F0(X263 ) SK101) → X253 V11[X94(0)|X253 ] 9 217 · 296
* (7 ∼ 1) denote the seven most signiﬁcant bits, the least signiﬁcant bit is guessed during the encryption phase.
† Measured in one computation of  or ⊕, instead of 1/4 round encryption.
‡ The details of this step are shown in Table 5 and explained in the maintext.
Table 5
Detailed procedure for Step 12 of Table 4.
Step Guess Known key #Bits Computing Counter Size Comp.
12-1 MK7(0) SK101(0) 1 X285(0) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(0) SK101(0)) → X263(0) V 110[X94(0)|X285(7∼1)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼1)|X263(0)]* 24 225 · 289
12-2 MK7(1) SK101(1) 1 X285(1) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(1)  SK101(1)) → X263(1) V 210[X94(0)|X285(7∼2)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼2)|X263(1∼0)] 23 224 · 290
12-3 MK7(2) SK101(2) 1 X285(2) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(2)  SK101(2)) → X263(2) V 310[X94(0)|X285(7∼3)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼3)|X263(2∼0)] 22 223 · 291
12-4 MK7(3) SK101(3) 1 X285(3) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(3)  SK101(3)) → X263(3) V 410[X94(0)|X285(7∼4)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼4)|X263(3∼0)] 21 222 · 292
12-5 MK7(4) SK101(4) 1 X285(4) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(4)  SK101(4)) → X263(4) V 510[X94(0)|X285(7∼5)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼5)|X263(4∼0)] 20 221 · 293
12-6 MK7(5) SK101(5) 1 X285(5) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(5)  SK101(5)) → X263(5) V 610[X94(0)|X285(7∼6)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7∼6)|X263(5∼0)] 19 220 · 294
12-7 MK7(6) SK101(6) 1 X285(6) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(6)  SK101(6)) → X263(6) V 710[X94(0)|X285(7)|X275 |F0(X273 )(7)|X263(6∼0)] 18 219 · 295
12-8 MK7(7) SK101(7) 1 X285(7) ⊕ (F0(X273 )(7)  SK101(7)) → X263(7) V10[X94(0)|X275 |X263 ] = V 810[X94(0)|X275 |X263 ] 17 218 · 296
* Note that the computation F0(X273 )(0)  SK101(0) could generate a carry bit, which is added to F0(X273 )(7∼1) . The value of F0(X273 )(7∼1) that counter
vector V 110 is counting here has been updated by this carry bit. The following steps in this table are done in a similar way.
have the same meaning as those in Table 4. According
to Table 5, the time complexity for Step 12 of Table 4 is
225 ·289+224 ·290+223 ·291+222 ·292+221 ·293+220 ·294+
219 · 295 + 218 · 296 = 8 · 2114 = 2117 1/4 round encryptions.
After Step 13 of Table 4, 96 master key bits have been
guessed and the parity of α  X9 ⊕ β  X25 could be eval-
uated for all zero-correlation linear approximations pre-
sented in Table 3. Then we proceed the following steps:
14. Allocate a counter vector V [z] of size 27 where each
element is 64-bit length for 7-bit z (z is the concatena-
tion of evaluations of 7 basis zero-correlation masks).
15. For 29 values of (X94(0)|X253 ), evaluate all 7 basis zero-
correlation masks with value (X94(0)|X253 ) and put
the evaluations to the vector z, then V [z]: V [z]+ =
V11[X94(0)|X253 ].
16. Compute T = N · 27 ·∑27−1z=0 ( V [z]N − 127 )2, if T  τ , then
the guessed key is a possible key candidate. As there
are 32 master key bits that we haven’t guessed, we
do exhaustive search for all keys conforming to this
possible key candidate. Only the right key value will
survive if all possible key values are tested against a
maximum of 3 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
4.1.1. Complexity estimation
In this attack, we set the type-I error probability α0 =
2−2.7 and the type-II error probability α1 = 2−8.9. We have
q1−α0 ≈ 1.02, q1−α1 ≈ 2.86, n = 64,  = 128. Then N
should satisfy
N = (2
n − 1)(q1−α0 + q1−α1)√
( − 1)/2+ q1−α0
+ 1 ≈ 262.79.
The decision threshold τ ≈ 26.35. There are 96-bit mas-
ter key value guessed during the encryption and decryp-
tion phase, and 296 · 2−8.9 = 287.1 key candidates survive
in the wrong key ﬁltration. These 287.1 key candidates
are tested exhaustively against a maximum of 3 plaintext-
ciphertext pairs along with the remaining 32 master key
bits. The complexity of Step 16 is about 2119.1 26-round
HIGHT encryptions which is also the dominant part of our
attack. In total, the data complexity is about 262.79 known
plaintexts, the time complexity is about 2119.1 26-round
HIGHT encryptions and the memory requirement are 243
bytes for counters. This is the ﬁrst attack on 26-round
HIGHT considering full whitening key with practical mem-
ory requirements.
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Table 6
Decryption procedure of the attack on 27-round HIGHT.
Step Guess Known key #Bits Computing Counter Size Comp.
4 MK3(7∼1) WK7(7∼1) 7 C6 ⊕WK7 → X306 V2[X94(0)|C7|C0|X306 |X305 |X293 ] 41 241 · 265
5 MK0 SK119 8 C7 ⊕ (F0(X306 ) SK119) → X307 V3[X94(0)|C0|X307 |X306 |X305 |X293 ] 41 241 · 273
6 MK3 SK114 0 X306  (F1(X305 ) ⊕ SK114) → X295 V4[X94(0)|C0|X307 |X305 |X295 |X293 ] 41 241 · 273
7 MK15 SK109 0 X305 ⊕ (F0(X293 ) SK109) → X283 V5[X94(0)|C0|X307 |X295 |X283 ] 33 241 · 273
8 MK0 WK4 0 C0WK4 → X300 V6[X94(0)|X307 |X300 |X295 |X283 ] 33 233 · 273
9 MK4 SK115 8 X300 ⊕ (F0(X307 ) SK115) → X297 V7[X94(0)|X307 |X297 |X295 |X283 ] 33 233 · 281
10 MK8 SK110 8 X307  (F1(X295 ) ⊕ SK110) → X285 V8[X94(0)|X297 |X295 |X285 |X283 ] 33 233 · 289
11 MK11* SK105 8 X295 ⊕ (F0(X283 ) SK105) → X273 V9[X94(0)|X297 |X285 |X273 ] 25 2126
12 MK12(7∼1)* SK106(7∼1) 7 X297  (F1(X285 ) ⊕ SK106) → X275 V10[X94(0)|X285 |X275 |X273 ] 25 2125
13 MK7* SK101 0 X285 ⊕ (F0(X273 ) SK101) → X263 V11[X94(0)|X275 |X263 ] 17 2125
14 MK3 SK197 0 X275 ⊕ (F0(X263 ) SK97) → X253 V12[X94(0)|X253 ] 9 217 · 2104
* The key bytes of MK11, MK12, MK7 are guessed bit by bit from the least signiﬁcant bit to the most signiﬁcant bit, respectively. The complexities could
be calculated in a similar way as described in the attack on 26-round HIGHT. Note that extra counters needed during this procedure are not listed.
4.2. Key-recovery attack on 27-round HIGHT
If we add one more round after the zero-correlation
linear distinguisher for 16-round HIGHT, we could attack
27-round HIGHT (round 4 to round 30) with full whiten-
ing key taken into consideration. The initial ﬁve rounds
encryption of our attack on 27-round HIGHT is the same
as that described in Section 4.1 shown in Fig. 1. The ﬁ-
nal six rounds are illustrated in Fig. 3. The key-recovery
phase could be proceeded with partial-sum technique from
Step 1 to Step 17 as follows.
1. Allocate a counter vector V1[X94(0)|C7|C6|C0|X305 |X293 ]
of size 241 where each element is 32-bit length and
initialize to zero.
2. Guess all possible values of 58 master key bits MK15,
MK14, MK13, MK2, MK1, MK6, MK3(0) , MK12(0) , MK7.
3. Partially encrypt and decrypt each of N (P ,C) pairs




3 . Add one to corresponding
V1[X94(0)|C7|C6|C0|X305 |X293 ].
The time complexity of Step 3 is no more than N · 258 ·
5
27 27-round encryptions. Then, we proceed Steps 4–14
shown in Table 6. The meaning of each column in Table 6
has already been described in Section 4.1. Also, Step 4 to
Step 14 of Table 6 are proceeded in the same way as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.
After Step 14 of Table 6, 104 master key bits have been
guessed and the parity of α  X9 ⊕ β  X25 could be eval-
uated for all zero-correlation linear approximations shown
in Table 3. Then we proceed the following steps:
15. Allocate a counter vector V [z] of size 27 where each
element is 64-bit length for 7-bit z (z is the concatena-
tion of evaluations of 7 basis zero-correlation masks).
16. For 29 values of (X94(0)|X253 ), evaluate all 7 basis zero-
correlation masks on (X94(0)|X253 ) and put the evalua-
tions to the vector z, then add the corresponding V [z]:
V [z]+ = V12[X94(0)|X253 ].
17. Compute T = N · 27 ·∑27−1z=0 ( V [z]N − 127 )2, if T  τ , then
the guessed key is a possible key candidate. As there
are 24 master key bits that we haven’t guessed, we
do exhaustive search for all keys conforming to this
possible key candidate. Only the right key value will
survive if each possible key value is tested against a
maximum of 3 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
4.2.1. Complexity estimation
In this attack, we also choose α0 = 2−2.7 and α1 =
2−8.9. Again q1−α0 ≈ 1.02, q1−α1 ≈ 2.86, n = 64,  = 127
and N should satisfy
N = (2
n − 1)(q1−α0 + q1−α1)√
( − 1)/2+ q1−α0
+ 1 ≈ 262.79.
About 2104 ·2−8.9 = 295.1 candidates are left after ﬁltration,
the complexity of the test in Step 17 is about 295.1 · 224 =
2119.1 27-round encryptions. Note that Steps 11, 12, 13
in Table 6 have comparable time complexity. So the time
complexity of our attack on 27-round HIGHT is about
(2126 + 2125 + 2125) · 14 · 127 + 2119.1 ≈ 2120.78 27-round en-
cryptions. The data complexity is 262.79 known plaintexts
and the required memory is about 243 bytes. Compared
with the previous best attack proposed in [14], our attack
on 27-round HIGHT has a lower time complexity and suc-
cessfully eliminates the requirements for unpractical mem-
ory.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the security of HIGHT with
respect to the novel technique of multidimensional zero-
correlation cryptanalysis. As a result, we can attack 27
rounds of HIGHT in less time with a practical memory
complexity. We also propose the ﬁrst single-key cryptanal-
ysis of 26-round HIGHT with all whitening keys. Thus, our
27-round attack improves upon the state-of-the-art crypt-
analysis for HIGHT and is the best non-exhaustive single-
key cryptanalysis of ISO standard HIGHT to date.
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